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COMMENTS
THE TITLE-BODY CLAUSE AND THE PROPOSED
STATUTORY REVISION
The continuing emphasis on legislative regulation and an in-
crease in the totality of legislative enactments' without notable
improvement in the calibre of legislative draftsmanship2 have focused
attention on questions of statutory construction. Probably the most
prolific source of comment and litigation has been the constitutional
restriction commonly termed the "title-body" clause,' and its numer-
ous ramifications.4 The Louisiana Constitution of 1921, Article III,
Section 16, provides that "every law enacted by the legislature shall
embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of such
object."5 In conformity with a general policy of seeking to effectuate
the legislative intent and of resolving doubt in favor of constitution-
ality,' the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a liberal construc-
tion of this constitutional requirement.
Early Louisiana cases' had established the principle that "every
law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one object,
and that shall be expressed in its title."8 This rule was mandatory
on the legislature and every enactment which violated it was void.'
However, in these early cases the court refused to apply the principle
in its more limited meaning, recognizing, as does the present court,
1. The total of enacted legislation for the 1946 session of the Louisiana legis-
lature was 444 enactments, Lazarus, Louisiana Legislation of 1946 (1946) 7
LOUISMNA LAw REvIEw 23.
2. Id. at 26, 45, the latter involving a discussion of La. Acts 78, 196 and 210
of 1946.
3. So called because the normal state constitution provides in substance that
no statute shall embrace more than one subject, which subject shall be expressed
in the title. 1 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (1943) 283 et
seq., § 1701.
4. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 80, for a discussion of the "title-body" clause
and its effect on the title of amendatory legislation.
5. A similar clause has been incorporated in all Louisiana Constitutions: La.
Const. (1845) Art. 118; La. Const. (1852) Art. 115; La. Const. (1864) Art. 118;
La. Const. (1868) Art. 114; La. Const. (1879) Art. 29; La. Const. (1898) Art. 31;
La. Const. (1913) Art. 31.
6. 3 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (1943) 131, § 5904.
7. Walker v. Caldwell, 4. La. Ann. 297 (1849); State v. Hackett, 5 La. Ann.
91 (1850), interpreting La. Const. (1845) Art. 118; State v. Harrison, 11 La.
Ann. 722 (1856), interpreting La. Const. (1852) Art. 115.
8. La. Const. (1879) Art. 29.
9. ". . . and it has been uniformly held that the provision was mandatory in
its scope and character, and that a violation of its requirements would entail
nullity of any act of the Legislature." State v. Heywood, 38 La. Ann. 689 (1886).
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that where a part of the statute is constitutional and a part uncon-
stitutional, it is permissible to separate the good from the bad."
Subsequent decisions" have, in accord with the great weight of
authority, 2 continued to temper the constitutional requirement by
application of the cardinal principle of legislative interpretation, that
where doubt exists, the presumption is in favor of validity. 8 The
courts down through the years, by simply refusing to ascribe an
intention to the legislature that would place an act in conflict with
the constitution, have held a statute void only where the variance
in the provisions of the act is palpable and totally irreconcilable with
its title,'4 or where both title and body express two distinct subjects.'
In conformity with this view, the court has upheld a statute
which exceeded the promises of its title by deleting those parts not
mentioned in the title. 8 Conversely, they have treated parts of the
title not included in the body of the act as mere surplusage. 7
The impelling force behind the court's liberal attitude has, of
course, been an insight into the primary object of the constitutional
requirement, which is to give the legislature and the public fair
notice of the scope of the legislation. The requirement is designed
to defeat deceitful, mysterious, and misleading practices of entrap-
ping the legislature into the passage of provisions unrelated to and
not intimated by the title of the bill." The dominant objective of
10. State v. Ferguson, 104 La. 249, 28 So. 917, 81 Am. St. Rep. 123 (1900);
State v. Atkins, 104 La. 87, 28 So. 919 (1900); State v. Goff, 106 La. 270, 80
So. 84 (1901).
11. State v. Duson, 130 La. 488, 58 So. 159 (1912); Peck v. City of New
Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So. (2d) 508 (1941) ; Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La. 146, 5 So.
(2d) 581 (1941).
12. See 1 Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 6, at 292, § 1704, for listing of
decisions from other jurisdictions.
18. "In considering questions of this character, the rule of liberal construction
has definite application to the end that the constitutionality of the act assailed
be upheld unless a contrary status is obvious. All doubts, if any exist, should be
resolved in favor of the law's validity." Ramey v. Cudahy Packing Co., 200 So.
3883, 885 (La. App. 1941).
14. 1 Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 6, at 296, § 1707.
15. State v. Harrison, 11 La. Ann. 722 (1856); State v. Ferguson, 104 La.
249, 28 So. 917, 81 Am. St. Rep. 123 (1900).
16. "... . where a part of a statute is constitutional and a part unconstitutional,
it is permissible to separate the good from the bad. . . . And if this were an act
whose title expressed only one object, while the body of the act set forth two
objects, -where the act is merely broader than its title,-it would be incumbent
on the court to restrict its declaration of the nullity . . . to that object of the act
. . . not indicated in the title." State v. Ferguson, 104 La. 249, 253, 28 So. 917,
919, 81 Am. St. Rep. 123 (1900).
17. 1 Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 12, at 299, § 1708.
18. For a good discussion of the history and purpose of the "title-body"
clause, see Comment (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAw REVxEW 72; Comment (1934) 10
Ind. L. J. 155; 1 Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 12, at 287 et seq, § 1702.
[Vol. Vill
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the provision is to insure the titling of the legislative act in a manner
which will give reasonable notice of the purview to the members of
the assembly and to the public. 9 The court has recognized, and
properly so, that the "title-body" clause of the Louisiana constitution
was not adopted to hamper or impede the legislative process by
requiring a needless multiplication of the number of statutes neces-
sary to effect a given purpose.
Justice Rogers, in Jackson v. Hart,"0 pointed out a valid and
significant distinction between Article III, Section 16, of the Consti-
tution of 1921 and prior constitutions2' by noting that
"under corresponding sections in preceding constitutions, it was
required that the object of the law be 'expressed' in its title. The
effect of the changing of the wording of the constitutional pro-
visions was to relax the previous requirement that the statute
must 'express' its object, so now all that is required is that the
title of the statute shoiuld be 'indicative' of its object. The con-
stitutional provision must be construed broadly rather than
narrowly, with a view of effectuating, not of frustrating, the
legislative purpose."
However, earlier courts in interpreting a similar requirement in
those prior constitutions had little difficulty in reaching the same
result, despite the provision that the object of the law be "expressed"
in its tide.2
This liberal approach on the part of the court has inevitably led
to fine distinctions, not always too clear or well defined. In cases
where the court holds one portion of a statute constitutional and
another unconstitutional, it is necessary to determine what is within
and what is without the purview of the title. The general test to
determine whether the inclusion in an act of numerous provisions
violates the constitutional prohibition against plurality of subject
matter is that of determining whether the various provisions are
"germane" to a single general purpose as expressed in the title of
the act.28
19. State v. Hincy, 130 La. 620, 58 So. 411 (1912). See also Comment (1944)
6 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 72, 74.
20. 192 La. 1068, 190 So. 220 (1939).
21. See note 5, supra.
22. Williams v. Payson, 14 La. Ann. 7 (1859); State v. Exnicios, 33 La. Ann.
253 (1881).
23. "'Germane' is defined as meaning in close relationship, appropriate,
relevant, or pertinent to the general subject, and no portion of a bill not germane
to the general subject can be given the force of law. The constitution is complied
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As early as 1885,24 the supreme court asserted that "it is sufficient
if it [the tide] indicate the general object or purpose of the law
without specifying each provision made therein."2 " An unbroken
line of jurisprudence has adhered to this principle." In 1943, the
court, after reviewing the jurisprudence, stated:
"In deciding whether a statute of the Legislature violates the
constitutional provision . . ., the courts must keep in mind its
main purpose as disclosed by its language. It matters not how
comprehensive the act may be or how numerous its provisions;
it does not violate the prohibition if its language, reasonably
construed, shows that it has one main, general object, or purpose,
and if nothing is written into it except what is naturally con-
nected with and incidental to the one purpose of the act."27
Thus, the test is primarily whether a particular part is germane
to the "object" as expressed in the title. "Whether a statute contains
more than one object must be determined from the body of the act
and not from its title."2  The title expresses the purpose. The
determination for the court is whether the subdivisions within the
act are necessary to or incidental to the expressed purpose of thelegislation.
It can be simply stated that while the "title-body" clause of the
present constitution has been treated as mandatory, it has been very
liberally and reasonably construed. Wherever possible the court
will salvage the statute by protecting that which is constitutional,
and expurgating that which is unconstitutional. On the whole, the
with if the various provisions relate to, and are a means of carrying out the
general purpose of an enactment." 1 Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 6, at 808,
§ 1711.
24. Louisiana Board of Trustees of the American Printing House for the
Blind v. Dupuy, 37 La. Ann. 188 (1885).
25. Id. at 191.
26. Edwards v. Police Jury of Avoyelles, 39 La. Ann. 855, 2 So. 804 (1887);
Thornhlll v. Wear, 181 La. 479, 59 So. 909 (1912); Surety Credit Co. v. Tieman,
171 La. 581, 181 So. 678 (1980); Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, 200
La. 341, 8 So. (2d) 49 (1942).
27. Wall v. Close, 208 La. 845, 14 So. (2d) 19 (1943).
28. State v. Morton, 182 La. 887, 162 So. 718 (1935).
29. "Where the title expresses a general object, the addition of subdivisions
of that object does not perforce render the whole title null. Act No. 183 of
1910."
"If a rigorous interpretation were adopted and nice technicalities followed,
it would result in defeating, without cause, the intention of the lawmaker.
"There Is no necessity of the title being a complete index to every section of
the act. It is only necessary that it shall, in general terms, direct attention to




constitutional provision on titles has two component parts. It limits
legislation to a single general subject; it requires that this single
object be indicated in the title. Certain general principles have
evolved from a multitude of decisions in point:
(1) If a title totally fails to express the subject of an act, or if
the title is misleading, the entire act is invalid.
(2) If the title indicates and the act actually embraces two
distinct objects, the courts will refuse to choose between the two, and
the act as a whole will fall.
(3) If the statute deals with more than one object, only one of
which is set forth in the title,' the whole act will not necessarily be
invalidated. The unconstitutional portion may be stricken out and
the valid portion enforced. However, if the unconstitutional portion
of the act is so interrelated and connected with the constitutional
parts that they cannot be separated without utterly destroying the
intention of the legislature then the entire act is void.
(4) If the title is broader than the act, that portion of the title
unnecessary to the act is regarded as surplusage.
(5) If the title restricts the body of the act; only the portion
of the act that conforms to the title is valid.
One major consideration worthy of note is the status of the
present undertaking by the Louisiana Law Institute to effect a
revision of the statutes' In face of the constitutional prohibition
that each law "shall embrace but one object,"" may the Revised
Statutes be adopted as a single statute?
Louisiana has had two general statutory revisions, and the
methods adopted in these instances shed little light on the present
question. The Revision of 1855 was accomplished piecemeal, title
by title, while the Revision of 1870 was enacted at the time when
the constitution provided that "every law shall express its object or
objects in its title,"32 and there was no bar to more than one object
being contained in the same enactment.8"
Thus there has been no instance in Louisiana jurisprudence
wherein the court has passed on the constitutionality of a general
30. Under authority of La. Act 42 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§
10011-10012].
31. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 16.
32. La. Const. (1868) Art. 114.
33. The revision became law as La. Act 96 of 1870.
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statutory revision, passed by a single act of the legislature. The
Criminal Code of 1942"' was passed by a single act, and its validity
upheld by the supreme court."5 Decisions of other states have simi-
larly upheld the passage of codes, dealing with particular fields of
substantive law, under one title."6
Despite that fact and although the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "object" refers to the aim or purpose of the statute, and has
adopted the liberal approach to the application of the constitutional
prohibition, a revision of statutes necessarily covers a multitude of
various and diverse subjects; whether or not a single statute would
be sufficient to take all such diverse fields into its fold is very
doubtful. In any event, the passage of the Revised Statutes as a
single statute with one title would raise immediately the question of
validity. Special steps will probably be taken to safeguard against
this contingency. In this regard, several possibilities present them-
selves: (1) to adopt a constitutional amendment, and pass the
revision as an enabling act or a provision in the proposed new con-
stitution which would specifically provide for the adoption of a
general statutory revision, or (2) to pass the revision piece-meal, title
by title-a long and cumbersome process.
Whatever steps are taken, it appears that to place the passage
of the revision beyond grave legal uncertainties, such action may
well be necessary. It would seem that for the first time the "title-
body" clause presents a stumbling block of a sort not easily brushed
aside by judicial determinations and distinctions.
GORDON KEAN
OWNERSHIP OF AIRSPACE IN LOUISIANA
"Article 505.' The ownership of the soil carries with it the
ownership of all that is directly above and under it.
"The owner may make upon it all the plantations and erect
all the buildings which he thinks proper, under the exceptions
established in the title: OF SERVITUDES.
34. La. Act 43 of 1942.
35. State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So. (2d) 868 (1944).
36. State v. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294, 73 Pac. 375 (1903), upholding the validity
of the Washington State Penal Code; Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. State,
104 Ga. 831, 81 S. E. 581 (1898), declaring valid a code of substantive law, similar
to the Revised Civil Code of 1870; Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N. W.
923 (1891), upholding validity of the Minnesota Probate Code.
1. La. Civil Code of 1870.
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